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Abstract
We present a solution to the Tierce problem, in which two players want to know whether
they have backed the same combination (but neither player wants to disclose its combination
to the other one). The problem is also known as the socialist millionaires’ problem, in which
two millionaires want to know whether they happen to be equally rich. In our solution, both
players will be convinced of the correctness of the equality test between their combinations and
will get no additional information on the other player’s combination. Our solution is fair: one
party cannot get the result of the comparison while preventing the other one from getting it. The
protocol requires O(k) exponentiations only, where k is a security parameter. ? 2001 Published
by Elsevier Science B.V.
1. Introduction
1.1. Description of the problem
Two players, both have decided to back a combination for the coming Tierc(e. 1
The players want to know whether they happen to back the same combination, but
neither player wants to simply disclose its combination to the other. This problem
is called the Tierce problem [19] or the socialist millionaires’ problem [10]. It is
a variant of the millionaires’ problem, introduced by Yao [17,18], in which two
players wish to compare their riches: they wish to know who is richer, but apart
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1 Tierc(e is a French betting game in which the winning combination consists of the three @rst of a horse
race (in order).
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from that they do not want to disclose any other information on their riches to each
other.
Formally, the problem is to @nd an ecient two-party protocol for the secure com-
putation of function f : {0; 1}∗×{0; 1}∗ → {0; 1} with f(x; y)= [x=y], where [B]=1
if condition B holds, and [B]=0 otherwise. (For the millionaires problem we may take
f(x; y) = [x¡y], interpreting x and y as nonnegative integers.) The basic security
requirements for two-party protocols, and more generally, multi-party protocols have
been laid out by Yao [17,18] and by Goldreich et al. [8].
Secure computation of f(x; y) thus means (i) that both players will be convinced
of the correctness of the result, while (ii) neither player learns more about the other
player’s input than what is implied by the value of f(x; y). In particular, for f(x; y)=
[x=y] this means that the player’s do not get any information on each others values if
x =y, except for the fact that the values are diIerent. In addition, we may require the
computation to be fair, which means that a player cannot stop the protocol after getting
the result of the comparison, and thereby preventing the other player from getting the
result too.
For secure computations it is assumed that the players are committed to their in-
puts. A secure computation cannot guard against cheating players who do not behave
according to their input values, e.g., by using a value x′ = x instead of x throughout
the computation of [x=y]. Similarly, a secure computation for f(x; y) does not guard
against cases in which the @rst player tries various values x1; : : : ; xn for x to @nd out
more about the value of y: if the second player happens to use the same y in these
computations then the @rst player is allowed to learn everything that is implied by the
knowledge of x1; : : : ; xn and f(x1; y); : : : ; f(xn; y).
For two-party computations it is also known that even for basic functions such as
the binary AND and OR no secure computations exist which protect the inputs of both
players at the same time in an information-theoretic way. We will therefore consider
secure computations of [x = y] for which condition (ii) above holds subject to an
intractability assumption, which will be the Decision Die–Hellman assumption in our
case.
A solution to the millionaires’ problem is described by Salomaa in [14] (and also
by Schneier [15]). From this solution, we can easily deduce a solution to the Tierce
problem. However, such a solution is only ecient when x and y are very small (the
complexity is exponential in the size of x and y). Jakobsson and Yung [10] presented
a solution with polynomial complexity requiring O(k) exponentiations, where k is a
security parameter, using many rounds of interaction. Moreover, all of these protocols
fail to meet the fairness requirement.
In this paper, we present a protocol with the same properties as the protocol by
Jakobsson and Yung but requiring only O(1) exponentiations, and requiring a few
rounds of interaction only. In addition, our protocol can be made fair, increasing the
cost to O(k), where k is a security parameter.
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2. Assumptions and proofs of knowledge
2.1. Notations
Let Zn denote the residue class ring modulo n and Z∗n the multiplicative group of
invertible elements in Zn. We let Gq denote a group of large prime order q, such
that computing discrete logarithms in this group is infeasible. For g; y∈Gq; g =1, we
let logg y denote the discrete logarithm of y to the base g, which is equal to the
unique x∈Zq satisfying y = gx. A common construction of Gq is to take the unique
subgroup of order q in Z∗p, where p is a large prime such that q |p − 1. Finally,
we let h : {0; 1}∗ → Zq denote a cryptographic hash function, i.e., h is one-way and
collision-resistant and we use h(a; b) to denote the image under h of the concatenation
of the strings a and b.
2.2. Assumptions
The security of our protocol involves three standard assumptions in cryptography.
The discrete logarithm (DL) assumption for group Gq states that it is infeasible to
compute logg y given random g; y∈Gq; g =1. Or, more formally, for all constants c
and for all suciently large q, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time Turing
machine which, on input Gq; g; y, outputs logg y with probability greater than 1=|q|c.
The Di6e–Hellman (DH) assumption for group Gq states that it is infeasible to
compute gab given random generators g; y1; y2 ∈Gq, where a= logg y1 and b= logg y2.
Or, more concisely, it is infeasible to compute gab given g; ga; gb for random a; b∈Zq.
The Decision Di6e–Hellman (DDH) assumption for group Gq states that it is in-
feasible to decide whether y = gab given random generators g; y; y1; y2 ∈Gq, where
a = logg y1 and b = logg y2. Or, more concisely, it is infeasible to decide whether
c = ab (which is equivalent to gc = gab) given g; ga; gb; gc for random a; b; c∈Zq.
Our result requires the DDH assumption, which implies the DH assumption, which
in turn implies the DL assumption. We will also use the equivalent formulation for DH
which states that it is infeasible to compute gb given g; ga; gab for random a; b∈Zq,
and similarly for DDH.
The DDH assumption is equivalent to the semantic security [9] (indistinguishability
of encryptions) of the ElGamal cryptosystem [6]. See [3] for a discussion of the DDH
problem.
2.3. Non-interactive proofs of knowledge
The following protocols are non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, and
correspond to well-known interactive honest-veri;er zero-knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge. The interactive protocols are converted to their non-interactive counterparts using
the generic transformation introduced by Fiat and Shamir [7]. This transformation pre-
serves the properties of the original protocol: Bob is convinced by Alice’s proof if and
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only if she holds the secret whose knowledge she proves, and at the end of the proto-
col Bob will not have learned any information on Alice’s secret. In fact, the resulting
non-interactive proofs can be proven secure in the random oracle model of [1] (see
[13]).
In order to simplify the description of the proofs of knowledge we assume that the
veri@er (in this case Bob) already knows all the public parameters related to the asser-
tion the prover (in this case Alice) wants to prove. Furthermore, to prevent that Alice
and Bob may copy each other’s proofs in our protocol for the socialist millionaires’
problem, we assume that the inputs to the hash function are appropriately diversi@ed,
e.g., by including a string that identi@es Alice or Bob and other diversifying informa-
tion.
2.3.1. Proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm
Schnorr’s protocol [16] allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows an element
x∈Zq satisfying y = gx, where y is Alice’s public key. Alice randomly selects an
integer r ∈Zq, computes W = gr; c = h(W ), and D = r − xcmod q. Then Alice sends
the proof (c; D) to Bob. Bob is convinced (accepts the proof) if c = h(gDyc).
2.3.2. Proof of knowledge of discrete coordinates
Okamoto’s protocol [11] extends Schnorr’s protocol to the case of two generators
g1; g2, where logg1 g2 is unknown to both Alice and Bob. Using the protocol described
below, Alice is able to prove to Bob that she knows x1; x2 ∈Zq satisfying y = gx11 gx22 ,
where y is Alice’s public key. Alice randomly selects two integers r1; r2 ∈Zq, computes
W = gr11 g
r2
2 ; c= h(W ); D1 = r1− x1cmod q, and D2 = r2− x2cmod q. Then Alice sends
the proof (c; D1; D2) to Bob. Bob is convinced if c = h(g
D1
1 g
D2
2 y
c). In contrast with
Schnorr’s protocol, this protocol is known to be provably witness-hiding [11].
2.3.3. Proof of equality of two discrete logarithms
Consider the same setting as for Okamoto’s protocol. The protocol described below
allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows an element x∈Zq satisfying y1 = gx1 and
y2 = gx2, where y1; y2 is Alice’s public key. Alice randomly selects r ∈Zq, computes
W1 = gr1; W2 = g
r
2; c = h(W1; W2), and D = r − xcmod q. Then Alice sends the proof
(c; D) to Bob. Bob is convinced (accepts the proof) if c=h(gD1 y
c
1; g
D
2 y
c
2). This protocol
is due to Chaum and Pedersen [4].
2.3.4. Proof of equality of two discrete coordinates
Similar to the extension of Schnorr’s protocol to Okamoto’s protocol, we extend
the Chaum–Pedersen protocol to the case involving several generators. The protocol
described below allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows x1; x21; x22 satisfying
y1 = g
x1
1 g
x21
2 and y2 = g
x1
1 g
x22
2 , where y1; y2 is Alice’s public key. Alice randomly se-
lects r1; r21; r22 ∈Zq, computes W1 = gr11 gr212 ; W2 = gr11 gr222 ; c = h(W1; W2); D1 = r1 −
x1 cmod q; D21 = r21 − x21cmod q, and D22 = r22 − x22cmod q. Alice sends the proof
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(c; D1; D21; D22) to Bob. Bob is convinced if c= h(g
D1
1 g
D21
2 y
c
1; g
D1
1 g
D22
2 y
c
2). The protocol
is easily adapted to the case in which y2 involves a diIerent pair of generators g′1; g
′
2
instead of g1; g2.
2.3.5. Proof that a coordinate is equal to 0 or 1
Consider the same setting as for Okamoto’s protocol. Suppose that x2 ∈{0; 1}. The
following protocol allows Alice to prove to Bob that she knows x1; x2 with x1 ∈Zq
and x2 ∈{0; 1} satisfying y = gx11 gx22 , where y is Alice’s public key. In particular, no
information on x2 other than the fact that it is in {0; 1} is revealed. This protocol is
constructed using the technique due to Cramer, DamgOard, Schoenmakers [5].
Suppose x2=v with v=0 or v=1. Alice randomly selects r; c1−v; D1−v ∈Zq, computes
Wv = gr1; W1−v = g
D1−v
1 (y=g
1−v
2 )
c1−v ; c= h(W0; W1); cv = c− c1−vmod q, and Dv = r −
x1cvmod q. Alice sends the proof (c0; c1; D0; D1) to Bob. Bob is convinced if c0 + c1 =
h(gD01 y
c0 ; gD11 (y=g2)
c1 )mod q.
3. The protocol
It is instructive to @rst consider the following naive protocol for computing [x = y]
securely. The players are called Alice and Bob. Let x be Alice’s input and y be Bob’s
one. The protocol starts with Alice sending h(x) to Bob, followed by Bob sending h(y)
to Alice, where h is a cryptographic hash function as above. If h(x)=h(y), then x=y
with overwhelming probability, hence both players may correctly compute the output
by evaluating [h(x) = h(y)]. However, the protocol is clearly not hiding the player’s
inputs, in the sense of semantic security [9]. For instance, Bob learns the value of h(x)
even if x =y, which enables him to test candidate values x˜ for x by comparing h(x˜)
with h(x). The protocol is also not fair, as Bob may refuse to return anything after
receiving h(x) from Alice.
The following protocol allows Alice and Bob to prove to each other that their
respective secrets x and y are equal (or not) in such a way that Bob learns nothing
about x and Alice learns nothing about y (except for the value of [x=y]). The protocol
is well suited to the case that x and y are small.
3.1. Parameter generation
Alice and Bob (jointly) generate a group Gq of a large prime order q (at least of
size 160 bits), e.g., by taking Gq as a subgroup of Z∗p for a large prime p (say of size
at least 1024 bits) such that q |p − 1, or, alternatively, by taking a group (of order
q) of points on an elliptic curve. They also decide on generators g0; g1; g2 of Gq, for
which they do not know loggi gj for i = j; 06i; j ¡ 3. The generation of such numbers
does not pose problems. We assume, to simplify the description of the protocol, that
x and y are elements of Zq (if x or y is larger than q, then we use this protocol to
compare h(x) and h(y) instead).
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3.2. Development of the protocol
Let k be a security parameter, such that it is computationally infeasible to do 2k com-
putations in a human-scale time and with human-scale computation resources (nowa-
days, k is taken equal to 80). We need that k ¡ |q|. In the protocol without fairness,
k is set to 0.
3.2.1. Step 1
Alice generates ga = g
xa
1 for random xa ∈Z∗q . Similarly, Bob generates gb = gxb1 for
random xb ∈Z∗q . They use Schnorr’s protocol to prove knowledge of xa and xb, respec-
tively. They also check that ga =1 and gb =1. Let g3 = gxaxb1 = gxba = gxab , which can be
computed by both Alice and Bob. 2
3.2.2. Step 2
Alice selects a random element a∈Zq and a random number e; 06e¡ 2k , and
computes
(Pa; Qa) = (ga3g
e
0; g
a
1g
x
2): (1)
Using the protocols of Section 2 she shows that there indeed exists an a∈Zq for which
she knows e; x∈Zq satisfying (1). Depending on whether we want to design a fair or
a non-fair protocol, Alice and Bob perform to following:
• (Fair version) Alice shows that she knows a; e∈Zq with 06e¡ 2k by choosing
random ai ∈Zq and ei ∈{0; 1};=0; : : : ; k − 1 subjected to the condition that a =∑k−1
i=0 ai2
i mod q and e =
∑k−1
i=0 ei2
i, and setting Bi = g
ai
3 g
ei
0 ; i = 0; : : : ; k − 1. This
kind of splitting has been used before in [2]. Then she proves that each ei is in
{0; 1} using the last protocol of Section 2. Since Alice can only know one pair
a; e satisfying Pa = ga3g
e
0, it follows that (Pa; Qa) is correctly computed by Alice. If
Alice @nds a′; e′ with a′ = amod q (hence e′ = e) satisfying Pa=ga′3 ge
′
0 then we have
g3 =g
(e−e′)=(a′−a)
0 hence logg0 g3 follows which contradicts the DL assumption. Alice
sends (Pa; Qa) and the proofs over to Bob. Bob veri@es the proofs and also checks
that Pa =
∏k−1
i=0 B
2i
i .
By symmetry, Bob does the same as Alice, computing Pb; Qb satisfying
(Pb; Qb) = (gb3g
f
0 ; g
b
1g
y
2 ); (2)
where b∈Zq and f; 06f¡ 2k are randomly chosen.
• (Version without fairness) Alice and Bob set e = f = 0; Pa = ga3 and Pb = gb3.
3.2.3. Step 3
In this step, Alice and Bob both compute (Pa=Pb; Qa=Qb), which will be of the form
(Pa=Pb; Qa=Qb) = (ga−b3 g
e−f
0 ; g
a−b
1 g
x−y
2 ): (3)
2 Another choice for g3 could be g3 = gagb. However, for this choice the resulting protocol enables any
eavesdropper to learn whether x = y or not, while in the present protocol this will only be known to Alice
and Bob.
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Then Alice produces
Ra = (Qa=Qb)xa
and a proof that logg1 ga = logQa=Qb Ra to show that Ra is correctly formed. Similarly,
Bob produces
Rb = (Qa=Qb)xb
and a corresponding proof. Now, Alice and Bob both know on account of (3) and the
de@nition of g3 that
Rab = Rxba = R
xa
b = (Qa=Qb)
xaxb = ga−b3 g
(x−y)xaxb
2 : (4)
3.2.4. Step 4
Finally, Alice and Bob fairly disclose the values of e and f. Once these values are
released, both Alice and Bob (but not anyone else) may determine whether x = y by
testing whether
Pa=Pb = Rabg
e−f
0 : (5)
On account of (3) and (4) this equality will hold if and only if x = y.
To disclose e and f without revealing the values of a and b, Alice and Bob execute
the following step for i = k − 1; : : : ; 1. They send each other the values of ai; ei and
bi; fi, respectively. Bob checks that Bi=g
ai
3 g
ei
0 and Alice does a similar check for bi; fi.
Subsequently, they respectively release only e0 and f0 (because if they reveal a0 and
b0, they also reveal to the other party the values of a=
∑k−1
i=0 ai2
i and b=
∑k−1
i=0 bi2
i, and
consequently the values of gx2 and g
y
2 ). Finally, Alice proves that she knows logg3 B0=g
e0
0
and Bob gives a similar proof for f0: this convinces the other party that the bits e0
and f0 are correct.
This step can be regarded as fair, because if Bob (for example) deliberately aborts
the protocol at i = l say, he will be only at most one bit ahead of Alice to test, by
exhaustive search, the combinations for the missing bits e0; : : : ; el.
3.3. Security
We will consider the security with respect to correctness, privacy, and fairness, where
we will consider Bob as the adversary and Alice as the honest party. However, we
could reverse these roles as our results are symmetric in nature and hide information
both ways.
For the security proofs, we will consider two diIerent kind of attacks: passive attacks
and active attacks. In the former case, the (passive) adversary correctly follows the
speci@cations of the protocol. Such adversaries model attacks that take place after the
protocol has been completed, and may involve either Alice or Bob. In the latter case,
the adversary may be active during the protocol and deviate from it. In particular, he
does not necessarily make random choices when it is prescribed in the de@nition of
the protocol. Security against such an adversary means that there is no strategy that
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increases the amount of information that this adversary learns about the secret of the
other party.
Correctness means that at the end of the protocol Alice and Bob are convinced of
the validity of the result of the comparison of their respective secrets. This is achieved
by the (non-interactive) proofs of knowledge given by Alice and Bob, which show
that the values exchanged in the various protocol steps are of the intended form. This
implies that test (5) at the end of the protocol is correct.
Privacy (or secrecy) means that the protocol hides the private inputs of Alice and
Bob, which are x and y, respectively. We have the following results which imply that
the protocol is secure against passive attacks.
3.3.1. Security against passive attacks
Clearly, if x = y, Bob will learn Alice’s secret. If x =y we have to show that
Bob learns no information about Alice’s secret. As the (non-interactive) proofs (of
knowledge) used during this protocol are zero-knowledge, the only information learnt
by Bob are the following values produced by Alice: ga=g
xa
1 ; Pa=g
a
3g
e
0; Qa=g
a
1g
x
2; Ra=
(Qa=Qb)xa ; e. Since e is released by Alice, and Bob knows xb; b, and y, Bob essentially
learns gxa1 ; T = g
axa
1 = (Pa=g
e
0)
x−1b ; ga1g
x−y
2 ; g
(x−y)xa
2 = Ra × (Pb=gf0 )x
−1
b =T .
Writing g1 = g, g
x−y
2 = g
w, xa = u, a= v, and reordering, we may summarize this by
saying that for a generator g, Bob essentially learns gu; guv; guw; gv+w.
To prove that the protocol is secure against passive attacks that fully recover the
value of x, we must prove that Bob is not able to compute x from gu; guv; guw; gv+w.
For this, it is sucient to prove that he is not able to compute gx−y2 = g
w from
gu; guv; guw; gv+w. By using the following lemma, we conclude that under the Die–
Hellman assumption, the protocol is secure against passive attacks that fully recover
the value of x.
Lemma 1. Under the DH assumption it is infeasible to compute gw from gu; guv; guw;
gv+w; for random u; v; w∈Zq.
Proof. Suppose we have an oracle computing gw given gu; guv; guw; gv+w, for random
u; v; w∈Zq. Then we show how to compute gb given ! = ga; " = gab for random
a; b∈Zq, hence contradicting the DH assumption. The reduction is as follows. Set
#= gac, for random c∈Zq, and give !; "; #="; gc to the oracle. Since this tuple is equal
to ga; gab; ga(c−b); gc the oracle returns gc−b, from which we obtain gc=gc−b = gb.
To prove that the protocol is secure against passive attacks that only partially recover
the value of x, we must prove that Bob is not able to decide whether a candidate value
x˜ is equal to x (unlike the naive protocol). Writing gt = gx˜−y2 , it is sucient for this to
prove that Bob is not able to decide whether t is equal to w given gt ; gu; guv; guw; gv+w.
By using the following lemma, we conclude that under the DDH assumption, the
protocol is also secure against this type of passive attacks.
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Lemma 2. Under the DDH assumption it is infeasible to decide whether t = w cor-
rectly from gt ; gu; guv; guw; gv+w; for random t; u; v; w∈Zq.
Proof. Suppose we have an oracle deciding t=w given gt ; gu; guv; guw; gv+w, for random
t; u; v; w∈Zq. Then we show how to decide whether b = c given ! = ga; " = gab; gc
for random a; b; c∈Zq, hence contradicting the DDH assumption. The reduction is as
follows. Set #= gad, for random d∈Zq, and give gd−c; !; "; #="; gd to the oracle. Since
this tuple is equal to gd−c; ga; gab; ga(d−b); gd the oracle will tell whether d−c=d−b,
from which we decide whether b= c.
Note that Lemma 2 may also be interpreted as follows in relation to the semantic
security of ElGamal encryption. Informally, an encryption scheme is semantically secure
if ciphertexts leak no information about the plaintext, i.e., the scheme is secure against
a passive adversary.
Corollary 3. Let y = gx denote the public key corresponding to private key x∈Zq.
Suppose that the value of m1=x is given in addition to an ElGamal encryption (gr; yrm)
of message m; where r ∈Zq is random. Then ElGamal encryption is still semantically
secure.
Finally, the fairness of the fair version of our protocol is straightforward. Both Alice
and Bob are unable to compute the result of the comparison before the beginning of
step 4. Moreover, during the fourth step, Bob’s advantage over Alice is at most one
bit. So, if Bob decides to abort the protocol and tries to search the remaining bits by
exhaustive research, Alice needs no more than twice as much time compared to Bob
to compute the same result.
3.3.2. Security against active attacks
So far, we have only considered the case of passive adversaries. Now, we will
extend the arguments developed above to the case of active adversaries. We will
show that our protocol remains secure even in this case, provided that g2 is jointly
computed by Alice and Bob. The random oracle model, formalized by Bellare and
Rogaway [3], will be used to model the behaviour of the hash function h underly-
ing the various non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of our protocol. In this model,
the hash function is replaced by an oracle which produces a truly random value (in
the range of the function) when queried. For identical queries, the same answers
are given. Various cryptographic schemes using hash functions have been proved se-
cure in this model. In particular, Pointcheval and Stern [13] provided security proofs
for signature schemes derived from honest-veri;er zero-knowledge identi@cation
schemes.
In our proofs below, all parties (including the adversary) will be modeled by proba-
bilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines with access to the random oracle.
As in the passive case, we will consider two types of attacks: active attacks that fully
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recover the secret x and active attacks that only partially recover this value. We will
prove the following result.
Lemma 4. Under the DH assumption and assuming the random oracle model; the
(modi;ed) protocol for the socialist millionaires’ problem is secure against active
attacks that fully recover Alice’s secret.
The above result can be easily extended to the security against attacks that only
partially recover the value of x.
Lemma 5. Under the DDH assumption and assuming the random oracle model; the
(modi;ed) protocol for the socialist millionaires’ problem is secure against active
attacks that only partially recover Alice’s secret.
We will only prove the Lemma 4. Lemma 5 can be proved in a similar way, as
in the passive case. Also, it suces to consider the version of the protocol that does
not address fairness, as the additions to make the protocol fair are not essential to our
argument below.
For our proof, we need to slightly modify the original protocol. We require that
Alice and Bob, in addition to g3, jointly compute g2. So, Alice generates ga2 = g
xa2
1
for random xa2 ∈Z∗q . Similarly, Bob generates gb2 =gxb21 for random xb2 ∈Z∗q . They use
Schnorr’s protocol to prove knowledge of xa2 and xb2 , respectively. They also check
that ga2 =1 and gb2 =1. Let g2 = gxa2 xb21 = g
xb2
a2 = g
xa2
b2 , which can be computed by both
Alice and Bob.
We are now assuming that Bob is the active adversary (the analysis of the case
in which Alice is the adversary is essentially the same). This means that Bob will
choose his values (xb; xb2 ; b, and y) in a ‘clever’ way rather than truly random as
speci@ed in the protocol description. However, the messages he will send will be in
accordance with the protocol. Our security proof is based on a reduction argument; we
prove that if an active adversary Bob (viewed as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing
machine) can @nd, with non-negligible probability, x, hence gx2, given the information
‘seen’ during the execution of the protocol, then this adversary can be used to build
a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine which contradicts the DH assumption
(we can easily adapt the proof to the DDH setting). Here the probability is taken over
the random tapes of Alice and Bob, the random oracles, the public parameters Gq; g1
and the integer x. For simplicity, we will not write in the sequel the dependencies on
the security parameter |q|, but when we say that an expression f is non-negligible,
this means that f depends on |q| and that there exists a positive integer c such that
f(|q|) is larger than 1=|q|c for all suciently large |q|.
Proof. Let g1; !=g
xa
1 ; "=g
axa
1 (where xa and a are random and unknown) be an instance
of the DH problem (see also Section 2.2). We want to obtain #=ga1. We will see how
we can use Bob to compute this value. We will ‘convert’ this instance to an input
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to our protocol, and exhibit a simulator S (a probabilistic polynomial time Turing
machine) capable of simulating the three steps of our protocol in such a way that the
adversary Bob cannot distinguish a real interaction with Alice from a simulated one.
Bob will be used as a resettable black box. In other words, the simulator will have
control over its tapes, and will have the ability to bring Bob to a halt and restart it in
its starting state at any time it wishes. All the simulations will be performed under the
random oracle model. S will play Alice’s role and will speak @rst in the protocol.
3.3.3. Step 1
S sends ! to Bob. Since S does not know xa, the proof required at this step
is simulated. In the random oracle model, where S has a full control of the values
returned by the oracle, this proof can easily be simulated. In order to produce this
proof, S randomly chooses c∈Zq and D∈Zq. S then de@nes the output of the random
oracle on the input (query) W = gD1 !
c to be c (which means that c= h(W )). Then S
sends the proof (c; D) to Bob. Note that S produces tuples (c; D) with an distribution
identical to the one produced by a real prover knowing xa. This is due to the honest
veri;er zero-knowledge property (special honest veri;er zero-knowledge in fact [5])
of Schnorr’s interactive protocol (see also [12] for the proof that such distributions
are the same). Then Bob sends gb to Alice along with a proof of knowledge (cb; Db)
(in the random oracle model) of xb the discrete logarithm of gb to the base g1; the
proof (cb; Db) is correct if cb = h(g
Db
1 g
cb
b ), where cb corresponds to the answer of the
random oracle to the query gDb1 g
cb
b . If this proof is not correct S aborts the protocol.
At this point, S needs to obtain the discrete logarithm xb in order to carry on with
its simulation. By using the technique developed by Pointcheval and Stern [13] and
known as the oracle replay attack (forking lemma) one can easily obtain this value:
if we replay Bob, with the same random tape and a diIerent oracle, Bob will produce,
with non-negligible probability and in polynomial time, two valid proofs (cb; Db) and
(c˙b; D˙b) with cb = c˙b (mod q) such that
gDb1 g
cb
b = g
D˙b
1 g
c˙b
b
holds. From this equation, S can compute xb=(D˙b−Db)=(cb−c˙b)mod q. Hence, S can
also compute g3 = g
xaxb
1 = !
xb = gxab , even though it does not know xa. S then generates
ga2 = g
xa2
1 for random xa2 ∈Z∗q and uses Schnorr’s protocol to prove knowledge of xa2
(since S really knows xa2 this is a real proof not a simulated one). Bob then sends
gb2 to Alice along with a proof of knowledge (in the random oracle model) of xb2 the
discrete logarithm of gb2 to the base g1. Again, by using the oracle replay attack, S
can @nd the value xb2 : Let g2 = g
xa2 xb2
1 = g
xb2
a2 = g
xa2
b2 . So at the end of step 1, Alice
knows xb and xb2 .
3.3.4. Step 2
S randomly selects an element d∈Zq and computes
(Pa; Qa) = (ga3; g
d
1):
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So, we have Pa = ga3 = g
axaxb
1 = "
xb . Again, S can compute this value since it extracted
xb from Bob. Following the de@nition of g2, we have
Qa = gd1 = g
a
1g
d−a
1 = g
a
1g
x−1a2 x
−1
b2
(d−a)
2 :
We put x= x−1a2 x
−1
b2 (d− a), where the simulator does not know a. Since d is a random
element of Zq, x is uniformly distributed in Zq and consequently constitutes a choice
that a real Alice could have made. S sends (Pa; Qa) to Bob and must also prove that
it knows a and x satisfying (Pa; Qa) = (ga3; g
a
1g
x
2). Since S does not know a, the proof
required at this step is simulated. In order to produce this proof, S randomly chooses
c; D1; D2 ∈Zq, and then de@nes the output of the random oracle on input W1; W2 with
W1 = g
D1
3 P
c
a and W2 = g
D1
1 g
D2
2 Q
c
a to be c (hence c = h(W1; W2)). With overwhelming
probability, Bob has not yet already queried the random oracle at this point. Then S
sends the proof (c; D1; D2) to Bob. Again the special honest veri;er zero-knowledge
property of the interactive protocol underlying this proof of knowledge ensures that
S produces tuples (c; D1; D2) with a distribution indistinguishable from one produced
by a real prover knowing a and x. Next, Bob sends Pb; Qb to S along with a proof
of knowledge of b; y∈Zq satisfying Pb = gb3 and Qb = gb1gy2 : Using the oracle replay
attack, S can @nd b and y (note that S now knows xb; xb2 ; b and y).
3.3.5. Step 3
In this step, S and Bob both @rst compute (Pa=Pb; Qa=Qb), which will be of the
form
(Pa=Pb; Qa=Qb) = (ga−b3 ; g
a−b
1 g
x−y
2 ):
Then S computes
Ra = (Qa=Qb)xa = g
dxa
1 g
−bxa
1 g
−yxa
2 = g
dxa
1 g
−bxa
1 g
−xa2 xb2yxa
1 = !
d−b−xa2 xb2y:
S can compute this value since it knows d; b; y; xa2 and xb2 . S sends Ra to Bob along
with a proof that logg1! = logQa=QbRa. Since S does not know xa, the proof required
at this step is simulated. To produce this proof, S randomly chooses c; D∈Zq. S
then de@nes the output of the random oracle on input W1; W2 with W1 = gD1 !
c and
W2 = (Qa=Qb)DRca to be c (hence c = h(W1; W2)). S then sends the proof (c; D) to
Bob. As before, the special honest veri;er zero-knowledge property of the interactive
protocol underlying this proof of knowledge ensures that S produces tuples (c; D) with
a distribution indistinguishable from those that would be produced by a real prover
knowing xa. The simulator’s part of the protocol is now complete.
Since the distribution of the simulated views is indistinguishable from that produced
by a ‘real’ Alice (not a simulated one), Bob, after the interaction with S, will be able,
as assumed, to @nd with non-negligible probability gx2, which is equal to g
d−a
1 . Since
S knows d; S can @nd # = ga1 = g
d
1 =g
d−a
1 , hence contradicting the DH assumption.
Consequently, such an adversary Bob cannot @nd gx2 hence cannot fully recover x.
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4. Conclusion
We have presented a protocol which allows one to fairly check the equality (or the
inequality) of two secrets x and y, and this gives an answer to the Tierce problem.
Counting the number of exponentiations, the complexity of our protocol is O(1) in its
simple version (without fairness) and O(k) in its fair version, where k is a security
parameter. However, designing an ecient solution to the millionaires’ problem, which
asks one to test whether x¡y, remains an open problem.
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